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Morey and Les

GEORGE SHER*

In my book Equality for Inegalitarians,1 I combined a sufficientarian
approach to the distribution of resources and opportunities with an
egalitarian approach to the distribution of a more abstract good that I
called “the ability to live one’s life effectively.” As I defined living
effectively, it requires a degree of success in the pursuit of one’s rational
aims, so there is an obvious danger that even if two people both have
sufficient resources and opportunities, the difference in the amount by
which they exceed the threshold will cause them to differ in their ability
to live effectively. However, to block this implication, I argued that lacking
the means to accomplish one’s ends is itself a reason to scale back one’s
aspirations. By thus relativizing a person’s rational aims to the resources
and opportunities at his disposal, I attempted to reconcile my commitment to
the equal distribution of the ability to live effectively with my acceptance of
inequality at the level of resources and opportunities.
To illustrate what I had in mind, I offered an example involving the
eponymously named Morey and Les. Even if Les has significantly fewer
resources than Morey, I wrote, the two may still be equally able to live
their lives effectively if the impact of Les’s having fewer resources and
opportunities is simply to give him reason to reduce his aspirations by a
commensurate amount. If Morey can afford an education at a top law
school while the best that Les can do is a year at a local community college,
then Morey’s rational ends may include a career in corporate law or high
finance while Les’s may extend no further than a steady job at an auto

*
© 2022 George Sher. Herbert S. Autrey Professor of Humanities, Professor of
Philosophy, Rice University.
1. GEORGE SHER, EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
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body shop. Assuming that Les and Morey are both able to achieve their
rational ends, and that nothing else prevents either one from living his life
effectively, the prevailing economic inequality will not render their society
unjust.2
In the years since the book’s publication, this passage has proven
troubling to readers who want more equality than I am willing to supply,
and my aim in the current paper is to address some of the objections that
it elicits. By confronting these objections head-on, I hope both to deflect
their force and to clarify the vision that animates the account at which they
are addressed.
I.
Perhaps the most obvious objection to my attempt to relativize a
person’s rational aims to the resources and opportunities at his disposal is
that it seems to endorse precisely the kind of adaptive preference
formation that has so often served to sustain oppressive social systems. It
is clear that a woman who has become comfortable with a repeated cycle
of abuse and reconciliation would be better served by the alteration of her
preferences than by their satisfaction, and it is no less clear that the tragedy
of black servitude is only compounded if its victims come to view their state
as natural and inevitable because they’re not fit for anything better. More
controversially, many feminists dismiss the preferences of women who
forgo careers in order to raise their families as the inauthentic products of an
unjust patriarchy. In each case, the authority of the parties’ preferences, and
so too of the aims to which those preferences give rise, is said to be
undercut by our recognition of the situational factors to which they were a
response.
Can the same be said about whichever of Les’s aims are shaped by the
modesty of the means at his disposal? One obvious point of discontinuity
concerns the psychological mechanisms through which the relevant
preferences are formed. In the cases cited above, the parties’ preferences
are most naturally viewed not as rational responses to their situations—
there is little benefit in acquiescing in continued abuse or regarding oneself
as worthless—but rather as the non-rational effects of hopelessness or
(in the case of traditional women’s preferences) social conditioning. By
contrast, when Les lowers his sights and replaces an unrealistic aim with
one that is within his reach, he will gain the undeniable benefit of being
able to get what he wants. Thus, whatever their ultimate status, the modest
aims at which he arrives will clearly have more going for them than the
ones that are standardly dismissed as the products of false consciousness.
2.
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If the only thing that was wrong with a preference to remain in an abusive
relationship or be subordinated to the will of another were its non-rational
origins, then this difference might decisively exonerate Les’s adjustment.
However, in fact, the non-rationality of their origins cannot be the only
thing that is wrong with these preferences; for they look even worse if we
suppose that their origins are rational. The only reason to cultivate such a
preference is to make the best of a bad situation that one sees no prospect
of escaping; and if the situation is unjust as well as disadvantageous, then
the rationality of adapting one’s preferences to it will hardly mitigate the
injustice. And, similarly, the fact that it is rational for Les to downgrade his
aspirations can hardly contribute to the justice of whatever social arrangements
make their downgrading rational. In Kok-Chor Tan’s words, “[r]ather than
developing a theory of distributive justice based on what people’s adjusted
expectations are, don’t we first need a theory of distributive justice in
order to determine people’s legitimate expectations and entitlements?”3
I think Tan is right about this, but I don’t think his observation compels
us to accept the analogy between Les’s preferences and those of the abused
wife or the happy slave. The reason we are confident in taking a person’s
adaptive preferences for subservience or abuse to be objectionable is that
we are convinced that no defensible theory of justice could justify any
social arrangements that might make it rational for him to cultivate them.
However, and in stark contrast, we can’t imagine a theory of justice that
doesn’t justify social arrangements that make it rational to trim one’s preferences
to fit one’s resources and opportunities. Because every distributive principle
will have to set some limits on the resources and opportunities to which
any given person has access, adjusting one’s ends to fit one’s means is no
less rational in a society that is organized around Rawls’s difference
principle or Dworkin’s conception of equality of resources than it is in a
society whose members have only the bare minimum they need to survive.
Thus, whatever else is wrong with Les’s aims, they cannot be faulted simply
on the grounds that they are shaped by his accurate sense of his own limits.
This, however, is unlikely to satisfy those who regard his scaled-down
ends as objectionable; for there are at least three further ways in which
they might press their claim. To do so, they might argue that what is

3. Kok-Chor Tan, Review of Equality for Inegalitarians, N.D. PHIL. REV. (Apr. 7,
2015), https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/equality-for-inegalitarians/. Rehka Nath makes a similar
point in her review of the book, which appears in 94 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 408 (2016).
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objectionable about the limitations that give Les reason not to aspire to an
advanced education or the advantages it would bring is either that
(1) Morey is not subject to any similar limitations, or that
(2) Les’s society could eliminate them if it chose to.
Alternatively, and more abstractly, it might be objected that
(3) when I say that Les’s relative lack of resources and opportunities
does not diminish his ability to live effectively, my contention
already presupposes, and so cannot be used to justify, the
claim that there is nothing wrong with the distribution that
makes it unreasonable for him to aspire to an advanced
education.
Let us examine each objection in turn.
II.
The first objection—that it is unjust for Les but not Morey to be in a
situation that makes it unreasonable for him to aspire to an advanced
education—is obviously not specific to the current case. A variant of the
objection can be expected to arise whenever one person’s resources or
opportunities give him access to some important advantage to which another
lacks access. Its implication, therefore, is that the only just distribution of
resources and opportunities is one that approaches equality.
Because the value of a person’s resources and opportunities lies in the
access they give him to other good things—because resources and opportunities
are instrumental goods—this egalitarian approach to their distribution might
make sense if (1) justice required an equal (or some related) distribution
of certain other, non-instrumental goods, and (2) the unequal distribution
of resources and opportunities was the main impediment to that further
distribution. However, whatever we say about (1), I think we have good
reason to reject (2); for once a person’s level of resources and opportunities
is high enough to meet his needs and to provide him with basic security—
this, very roughly, is what the sufficiency view requires—his fortunes going
forward will depend far less on how much additional wealth or opportunity
he has than on a variety of external factors over which neither he nor his
society can exercise much control. To bring out the pervasive impact of
contingency on each person’s fortunes, it will be helpful to consider a few
examples.
Think, therefore, of a young man who catches a young woman’s eye in
philosophy class, discovers that she is willing to take a flyer, and initiates
what will turn be a long-running involvement. Over the years, he will fare
much better if she ends up as his deeply compatible life partner than he
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will if she turns out, too late, to be an extreme narcissist or an incorrigible
sexual wanderer; yet the gradual unfolding of her personality is something
that neither he nor his society can either predict or control. And, along
similar lines, the young man will fare better if his children grow into adults
with good characters and good lives than if they end up moochers, liars or
addicts; better if the demand for his skills increases than if it declines; better
if his health holds up than if he suffers chronic pain or a series of debilitating
illnesses; and better if those he likes and loves survive than if they die
prematurely. On a more daily basis, he will fare better if his new boss is
sensible than if he is a jerk; better if his cough disappears than if it turns
into bronchitis; better if his house isn’t burgled than if it is; better if the
cable stays on than if it goes out; and so on without end. In each case, the
contingencies that make the difference are not ones that would yield to
even the best-designed of social programs.
Given the profound role that fortune plays in determining how each
person fares, the fact that Les must spend his time hammering out dents
in fenders while Morey is busy hammering out legal settlements will not
tell us much about how well either is doing. Some who work in body shops
are lucky enough to have close families, enjoy decent health, and achieve
many of the aims that are appropriate to their circumstances, while others
are less fortunate; and the same obviously holds for those in Morey’s
profession. Thus, however we understand the non-instrumental goods for
whose acquisition one’s resources and opportunities are instrumental—
whether we are hedonists, desire-satisfactionists, perfectionists, objective
listers, or something else—the initial differences in Les’s and Morey’s
resources and opportunities seem unlikely to be the main determinant of
their relative levels of well-being going forward.
I don’t quite mean that those differences play no role. For one thing,
even if Les is realistic enough not to aspire to an opulent house or frequent
travel, it will presumably remain true that he would prefer to have these
things if given a choice. Thus, to whatever extent his well-being depends
on the satisfaction of his preferences as opposed to his success in achieving
his rational aims, Les’s relative inability to satisfy these preferences will
indeed represent a respect in which he is worse off. In addition, on the
widely held view that choosing autonomously has a value that is distinct
from the value of what is chosen, Morey’s having a greater range of options
from which to choose may represent a further respect in which he is better
off. Here, then, are two ways in which the difference in their resources and
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opportunities may indeed appear to make a difference in the goodness of
their lives.
If either difference were significant, then we would not be entitled
to infer, from a society’s lack of control over the vicissitudes that play the
major role in determining each person’s well-being, that it need not bother
equalizing whatever further determinants of well-being do fall within its
control. In that case, the egalitarian could reasonably insist that even if the
state can’t fully equalize the well-being of its citizens, it is still obligated
to go as far as it can in this direction. It seems to me, though, that neither
of the cited differences -is significant, and that as long as Les and Morey
both surpass the relevant threshold for resources and opportunities, no
difference that their surpassing it by different amounts can make to either
their numbers of satisfied preferences or their ranges of options can have
more than a trivial bearing on the goodness of their lives.
To see why it can’t matter much that Morey has fewer unsatisfied preferences
than Les, we need only remind ourselves of how many preferences of the
relevant sort each person has. To say that someone has a preference of this
sort for A over B is simply to say that he would choose A over B if asked,
so each person has as many such preferences are there are pairs of activities,
outcomes, or states of affairs between which he could be asked to choose.
By this promiscuous standard, Les’s unsatisfied preferences for an opulent
house and frequent travel are members of the extremely capacious set that
also includes his unsatisfied preferences to have a full head of hair rather
than a widow’s peak, to tan rather than burn, to have a house that never
gets dirty, to look like a movie star, to skip work whenever he feels like
it, to be smarter, stronger, more attractive, more athletic, and more popular
than he is, to live for hundreds of years, and to be able to wiggle his ears,
read minds, become invisible, fly a plane, swim the English Channel, jump
over the moon, and travel backward and forward in time. I think, in fact,
that it is implausible to take the satisfaction or frustration of preferences
like these to have any impact on Les’s well-being, but my argument does
not require anything this strong. Instead, the point I need to make is only
that even if Les’s well-being can affected by the satisfaction or frustration
of preferences like these, his having uncountably many of them must mean
both that (1) the frustration of any one or small number of them will reduce
his well-being by only a minuscule amount, and that (2) even if slightly
fewer of Les’s than of Morey’s preferences are satisfied, their ratios of
satisfied to unsatisfied preferences will remain virtually identical.
The argument of the preceding paragraph presupposes that all of the
cited preferences are of equal significance. It therefore may seem vulnerable
to the objection that Les’s inability to buy a better house or travel
extensively seems likely to bother him more, and thus to reduce his wellbeing by a greater amount, than his inability to jump over the moon or
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visit the past. However, to mount an objection of this sort, one would have
to treat Les’s preferences for a better house and more travel not merely as
dispositions to make the relevant hypothetical choices, but rather as the
affective and conative echoes of certain incompletely suppressed aspirations.
To whatever extent Les still aspires to traveling extensively and having a
big house, he has not completely adjusted his aims to the resources at his
disposal. However, the claim that I am defending is only that if Les has
completely adjusted his aims, then he is not made significantly worse off
by not having what he no longer seeks but would still go for if given the
choice. To this claim, the reactions of the version of Les who has not
completely adjusted his aims are simply irrelevant.
The other respect in which Les may be said to be worse off—that he
has fewer options than Morey—requires different treatment. The reason
we cannot simply extend the previous argument, and say that any
difference between Les’s and Morey’s ranges of options is as trivial as the
difference between their ratios of satisfied to unsatisfied preferences, is
that options are not as easily generated as unsatisfied preferences. There
are indefinitely many pairs of states of affairs between which a person can
be envisioned as choosing, but there is a vastly smaller number of outcomes
that he can actually choose to bring about. Because each person’s options
are limited in a way that his preferences are not, the number of options
that Morey has but Les lacks cannot be assumed to be dwarfed by the
number they both have.
Yet even if Les does have significantly fewer options than Morey, it
will not follow that he is significantly less autonomous. It is true that a
person cannot be autonomous unless he has a suitable range of options from
which to choose, but that hardly means that he becomes more autonomous
with each addition to his range of options. As many have noted, what autonomy
requires is not that an agent have any particular number of options, but
only that his options be numerous, diverse, and meaningful enough to enable
him to exercise his critical faculties while making choices that matter. For
someone like Les, who is above the sufficiency threshold, this requirement
will be satisfied as a matter of course. Like most others, Les is bound to
face a constant series of decisions about what to buy, how to deal with his
children, whether to change jobs or apartments, how to reconcile his and
his wife’s interests, how to spend his free time, and how to handle the
inevitable surprises that complicate every life. Given his modest but
steady income and his transferable skills, he can be expected to have some
leeway in these matters but to be subject to a definite set of constraints.
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Because these are precisely the conditions under which the exercise of
practical judgment is both possible and necessary, we need not worry that
Les’s having fewer options than Morey will make him any less autonomous.
III.
But quite apart from any comparisons with Morey, why should Les have
to trim his aspirations back? If Les’s society can afford to provide him
with access to higher education, then why shouldn’t it? As long as the
resources are available, isn’t it unjust for the society to withhold them?
There is a version of this second objection that I can accept. If we
assume that Les’s society is both (a) rich enough to make access to higher
education available to all without compromising any of its more essential
functions, and (b) able do this without either incurring unmanageable debts
or saddling its members with unreasonable tax burdens, then it may indeed
have good reason to adopt arrangements that would make it unnecessary
for someone like Les to trim back his aspirations. Its reasons may include
the economic benefits of an educated workforce, the intrinsic value of
knowledge, and perhaps also the normative priority of Les’s pre-adjustment
aims to whichever others he will acquire as he bends to reality. However,
even if conditions (a) and (b) are both met, and of course a fortiori if they
are not, I don’t think any of these reasons, or all of them together, can add
up to anything approaching an imperative of justice.
To bring the issue into focus, it is crucial to remember that the complaint
we are now considering is not a comparative one. What is said to be wrong
is not that Morey has access to higher education while Les does not, but
only that Les’s society does not provide him with such access even though
it comfortably could. To support the latter complaint, a conception of
justice must have a sufficientarian component, and must set its resource
and opportunity threshold high enough to provide everyone who meets it
with access to an advanced education. Because setting the threshold this
high would be quite expensive, it would require a level of taxation that
would otherwise not be needed and would absorb resources that could be
used in many other ways. These opportunity costs don’t mean that universal
access to higher education isn’t a requirement of justice, but they do mean
that its having that status isn’t an automatic consequence of the society’s
ability to afford it.
Can this gap in the argument be bridged? One way to do so would be to
identify some advantage which is both (1) unavailable to those who lack
a higher education and (2) important enough to make its universal availability
a requirement of justice. However, the options here are limited by our
operating assumption that those who lack access to an advanced education
will, like Les, have adjusted their goals accordingly; for on this assumption,
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there is nothing of which their lack of access has deprived them that is
also something that they want.
Here as above, we may be tempted to insist that there is a sense in which
these individuals -do want many of the luxuries that are beyond their reach.
Even if they no longer aspire to them, they are still likely to want them in
the sense that they would prefer to have them if given a choice. However,
here again too, the fact that each person has indefinitely many such
preferences will imply that the frustration of any small number of them
does not make him significantly worse off. Just as the version of Les who
has adjusted his aspirations downward was seen to have virtually the same
ratio of satisfied to unsatisfied preferences as the more affluent and educated
Morey, so too does that version of Les have virtually the same ratio of
satisfied to unsatisfied preferences as the imaginary more educated version
of himself whose aspirations and attainments are both higher.
Given this difficulty, anyone who wants to argue that those who lack
access to an advanced education are made seriously worse off by not being
able to get one must take a different tack. He must claim that their having
such an education, or having some of the things that it makes possible,
would be significantly better for them even though they don’t want those
things. When the things in question are material advantages—when they
consist of luxuries like a larger house and the ability to travel—this claim
is not particularly plausible. It gains in plausibility when the purported
benefits are said not to be material—when, for example, they are said to
consist of the broadened intellectual horizons that a higher education can
bring—but even when it is understood in this way, the claim that having
them would make any person’s life significantly better remains open
to serious objection.
For if we accept it, then what are we to say of those who are either
temperamentally unsuited to higher education or intellectually incapable
of benefiting from it? If only a higher education can broaden a person’s
intellectual horizons, and if having broad horizons is enough of a benefit
to qualify as a requirement of justice, then won’t it follow that anyone
who is unsuited to higher education must live a significantly worse life
than anyone whose situation is otherwise comparably but who is better
educated? And do we really want to say this? Is it really a misfortune to
be someone who finds the classroom stifling, joins the army at seventeen,
and thrives in the structured environment of the military? Are those who
love high school shop class and go to work as machinists really worse off
than those who go on to study accounting or deconstruct literary texts?
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Must we really pity those who forgo college to support or raise families?
And, more generally, are the lives of those who slot comfortably into the
intellectually undemanding but necessary jobs that keep things running—
the bank tellers, plumbers, shoe salesmen, exterminators, tree trimmers,
file clerks, yard workers, bus drivers, custodians, grocery baggers, and
mechanics on whom we all rely—really all a step down from those of their
college-educated counterparts? At least to my ear, these claims sound
insufferably condescending; but unless we accept them, we will have no
reason to regard the life that matches Les’s downsized aspirations as any
worse than the one he would have lived if he had had reason to set his
sights higher.
IV.
Yet even if this is so, there remains a further way of arguing that Les
has been deprived of an advantage that his society was under an obligation
of justice to provide. Reduced to its essentials, the further argument is that
even if Les is no worse off living the life that fits his downsized aspirations
than he would be if he hadn’t had to downsize, what remains unjust is his
society’s failure to enable him to develop the talents that (we may assume)
made him capable of more. The “more” in question can be understood in
different ways—either as a more active mental life or as the acquisition
of new skills and the accomplishments to which they might have led—but
either way, the operative idea is self-realization. What Les has been deprived
of, on this reading, is not the opportunity to live the best life, but rather
the opportunity to be his best self.
Unlike the previous argument, which implied that not having a higher
education is always a misfortune, the current argument implies that the
only persons for whom not having such an education is a misfortune are
those who are qualified and temperamentally suited for one. For that reason
among others, I regard this as the more serious challenge to my claim that
Les’s lack of access to higher education is not unjust. However, even when
the challenge takes this form, I doubt that the charge of injustice can be
sustained.
One obvious problem with the self-realization argument is that it rests
on a perfectionist premise that many would reject. However, because I
myself have perfectionist leanings, I am not inclined to contest the argument on
these grounds. In addition, although I have my doubts, I also won’t question
the argument’s premise that expanding the intellectual horizons of the
gifted is a requirement of justice, and neither will I challenge the highly
idealized view of higher education that underlies the idea that providing
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access to it will satisfy such a requirement.4 Instead, I want to grant all
this and focus exclusively on the kind of access to higher education that
justice might be said to require. My aim in doing this is to bring out an
important difference between the sense in which Les lacks access to higher
education and the sense in which justice might plausibly be said to require
that he be provided with it.
As of January 2020, the average body shop technician in the United
States earned a salary of $53,081 a year; counting benefits, his job-related
income was $78,339. That’s not a fortune, but someone who earns that
much has a fair amount of latitude in how he spends it. He can, for example,
choose where to live, (sometimes) whether to buy or rent, whether to go
away for vacations or stay home, whether to buy a new car or stick with
the old one, and whether to frequent restaurants or pack lunches and eat
his dinners at home. By going low end on these and other decisions, Les
can, at a minimum, save enough to afford further classes at his inexpensive
community college. From there the path forward is less certain, but if he’s
good, he may well be able to take advantage of one of the burgeoning
feeder arrangements between two and four year colleges, and may well be
able to qualify for at least some financial aid. Moreover, even if Les can’t
manage either of these things, it seems safe to predict that anyone who has
his financial resources and skills and is willing enough to make sacrifices
and defer gratification will eventually succeed in acquiring a higher education.
Thus, even if the Les whom we have encountered doesn’t have Morey’s
immediate access to a horizon-expanding higher education, he does have
what he needs to acquire one in the longer term.
Does this form of access satisfy the purported requirement of justice?
That depends, of course, on how long Les must wait and how much he

4. Promotional brochures notwithstanding, I think it is fair to say that for most
students at most of today’s educational institutions, both the aim of attending college and
its actual life impact are better described as gaining a needed credential and having some
fun away from home than they are as gaining new insight into the human condition.
Moreover, in an intellectual environment as rich with taboos as that of today’s academy,
any paths to new ideas are bound to be strewn with barriers to their pursuit. I don’t want
to overstate the case: there are obviously many students who do come away from college
thinking thoughts they otherwise would never have thought; and some of these new thoughts
are even worth thinking. However, there must be some number below which the ratio
of those who do experience intellectual and moral growth in college to those who don’t is
simply too low to make promoting such growth by providing universal access a requirement
of justice; and in my own (no doubt jaundiced) view, the ratio in the real world just doesn’t
make the cut.
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must sacrifice. The requirement would presumably not be satisfied if Les
couldn’t complete his course of study until he was eighty years old, or if
he had to spend years working three jobs and living out of his car in order
to pay for it. However, in the case as described, the needed sacrifices seem
far less extreme, and are surely compatible with Les’s living a decent and
comfortable life. In addition, precisely because he does have to sacrifice
to realize his intellectual potential, Les will, in the process, also be developing
an aspect of his moral potential. As a result, he will in one respect come
closer to realizing his best self than someone who simply has an education
handed to him. I don’t take this to mean that Morey’s society is doing him
an injustice by allowing him to acquire a horizon-expanding higher education
without having to sacrifice for it, but I do think that when the demand for
sacrifice is backed by the view that a just society must enable its members
to become their best selves, it is at least less inapposite than it would be
in many other contexts. In any event, my present point is simply that any
reasonable version of the view that a just society must provide the sort of
access to higher education that will enable its members to realize their
potential is likely to be amply satisfied even by Les’s weak form of access.5
In mounting this argument, I have relied on statistics about what body
shop technicians actually earn. Because Les himself was said to work in
a body shop, this is a fair way of rebutting the charge that his income in
particular is too low to enable him to acquire the higher education that
would unlock his potential. However, anyone who advances that charge
about Les will of course also want to extend it to the grocery baggers, yard
workers, shoe salesmen, exterminators, and other blue-collar workers who
populated our earlier list; and many of these people have incomes that are
considerably lower than Les’s. Although they too are likely to have some
leeway in how they spend their money, they must on average devote more
of it than Les to the non-negotiable essentials, and so must sacrifice more,
and must do so over a longer period time, to be able to afford a potentialunlocking higher education. A fortiori, the same will hold for whichever
day laborers, convicted felons, and unemployables might have the talent
and discipline to benefit from a higher education (if, indeed, these individuals
have any discretionary income at all). Thus, even if Les’s path to self5. It is worth noting that whatever case there is for providing Les with this form
of access is not undermined by our assumption that he has adjusted his aspirations to match
his resources. It is true that under that assumption, Les’s believing that he had no chance
of acquiring a higher education would have led him not want such an education, and so
would have left him unmotivated to make the sacrifices that are necessary to get one.
However, it is also true that in a society that does make higher education available to those
who are willing to sacrifice for it, Les will not form the belief that he has no chance of
acquiring such an education, and so will not have to adjust his aspirations by abandoning
whatever desire he might otherwise have for one.
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realization is unproblematic enough to satisfy the requirements of justice,
it is far from clear that this also holds for those who are lower on the
economic ladder.
Let us grant, for purposes of argument, that an affluent society is obligated
to provide any of its members who qualify with the kind of access to
higher education that is currently available to Les but is not available to
the average exterminator, checkout clerk, carpet installer, or day laborer.
If Les’s resources and opportunities surpass the sufficiency threshold,
then that threshold must fall somewhere between his level of these goods
and that of these individuals. To eliminate injustice, the society must therefore
increase the opportunities and resources that are available to checkout
clerks, laborers, and the rest until they too are at or above that threshold.
While this would indeed make these individuals as able as Les to acquire
a higher education by sacrificing and deferring gratification, it would not
make them as able as Morey to afford one right away. Thus, even when
we extend the self-realization argument to those who have far fewer
resources and opportunities than Les, it will not imply that the state must
directly subsidize anyone’s higher education.
V.
But is even Les’s level of resources and opportunities really sufficient
for justice? In response to the charge that it is not, I have argued that
because Les has reason to trim his ends to fit his means, he will, if rational,
be no less able than Morey to achieve his rational aims. However, as Tan
has observed, this response will be compelling only if the level of resources
and opportunities to which Les has reason to adjust his aims is in fact high
enough to satisfy the requirements of justice. Since that is precisely what
is at issue, doesn’t my argument simply beg the question?
This is the third and final objection I will consider, and once again, there
is a version of it that I can accept. It would indeed be fallacious to infer,
from the premise that it is rational for Les to trim his ends to fit his means,
that the resources and opportunities at his disposal must satisfy the requirements
of justice; for it would be no less rational for him to make this adjustment
if they did not. However, when the objection is put this way, it does not
make solid contact with the argument I am advancing; for my point in
observing that it is rational for Les to trim his ends to fit his means is not
to establish that his resources and opportunities satisfy the requirements
of justice, but only to disarm a worry that is raised by the claim that they
do. Both here and in the book, my aim in stressing the rationality of the
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adjustment is only to show that even if two rational individuals exceed a
defensible sufficiency threshold by very different amounts, that difference
need not translate into either an indefensible difference in the their ability
to achieve their aims or an indefensible deficit in the worse-off person’s
ability to do so. Just how high a defensible sufficiency threshold should
be set, and indeed whether justice is a matter of sufficiency at all, are
independent questions that must be resolved on other grounds. I believe,
in fact, that the sufficiency approach is correct, and I believe as well that
the considerations that determine the location of the resource/opportunity
threshold are closely linked to those that support the view that Les’s weak
and indirect form of access to higher education is good enough;6 but these
are not the claims that I am defending here.
To end, I want to raise, without trying to answer, a further question that
so far has hovered just offstage. The source of that question is the gap
between the claim that Les has good reason to adjust his ends to fit his
means and the further claim that he, or someone in his position, would in
fact do so. Because Les is a creature of my imagination, I can close the
gap in his case by simply stipulating that he does make the adjustment,
but the real world is bound to contain many who will not. When someone
fails to adjust his ends to fit his means, his ability to live his life effectively
is compromised, and his inability to achieve the sorts of goals that are
within the reach of others is likely to be keenly felt. If someone who surpasses
the threshold falls short in these ways, is it still legitimate to respond to
the charge of injustice by pointing out that he could avoid the difficulty
by making the adjustments that rationality dictates?
I am of two minds about this question. On the one hand, in an environment
in which unearned inequalities of wealth and opportunity are both common
and salient, it seems natural enough for someone who has less than others
to wonder why that should be so, and to resent the limitations on what he
can do in a way that makes it difficult for him to reconcile himself to them.
If the difficulty of fully internalizing a revised set of ends is great enough,
the claim that his situation remains just because a rational person in his
situation would do so begins to ring hollow. However, on the other hand,
the state can do only so much, and if a non-comparative approach to
distributive justice is in fact defensible, as the sufficientarian takes it to
6. Put most simply, the sufficiency threshold as I understand it is the lowest level
of resources and opportunities at which an agent becomes able to do things that give him
a reasonable chance of increasing his stock of resources and opportunities at a reasonable
rate without having to endure unreasonable hardships; for elaboration, see Chapter 8 of
EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS, supra note 1. The claim that someone in Les’s position
has an adequate amount of control over his educational future is a special case of the
broader claim that someone who meets or exceeds this threshold has an adequate amount
of control over his future life.
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be, then it may well be thought to have discharged its obligations by elevating
each citizen to a defensible threshold. Even in a totally just world, navigating
life’s vicissitudes is often hard, and as long as the obstacles that one faces
are not otherwise unjust, it is not clear why the difficulty of overcoming
one’s resentment at the fact that others don’t have to face them should
alter that status.
As is perhaps obvious, my own inclination is to favor the second of
these approaches, in part because I view the human propensity to envy
others as an unattractive reason to alter our thinking about justice. I must
acknowledge, though, that because I am writing this from the perspective
of someone who is not himself called upon to do much downsizing, the
position I am defending may have a let-them-eat-cakeish quality that makes
it equally unattractive to those who occupy a different perspective.
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